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Abstract
In the increasingly legitimized neo-liberal climate, state governments have 
adopted policies that divest themselves o f formalized regulation. This move towards the 
deregulation of corporate policy has created a unique climate in which the responsibility 
of minimizing risk and behaving in a responsible manner is left to market forces to 
regulate. Corporations claim to have subsequently adopted self-mandated policies of 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) as a means of expressing their commitment to 
moral concerns. The Case of Canadian oil producer EnCana illustrates that while the 
admirable moral policy may exist, actual practice does not. EnCana’s negligent 
environmental and social behaviour in Ecuador necessitate an examination of how an 
unregulated doctrine of corporate social responsibility can be used to harm the public 
good. Its use of a corporate constitution not only as a public relations ploy to enhance its 
reputation, but also as a smoke-screen to deter attention from the reality of its practices, 
raises serious questions regarding the validity o f a CSR doctrine. This article connects 
theoretical discussions of neo-liberal policy and the rise of corporate social responsibility 
to practical problems that plague the implementation o f such policies.
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Campaigns o f Corporate Social Producer EnCana Responsibility: The Case of
Canadian Oil
Neo-liberal policies have ushered in an era in which formalized state regulations 
are replaced by a less intrusive form of individual responsibilization where corporations 
are governed at a distance (Dean, 2003; Rose, 1999). As a result, the industry-led 
conceptualization o f corporate social responsibility (CSR) is often viewed by states, 
corporations and consumers as a means o f rectifying the corporate acts of irresponsibility 
as well as perceived inefficiencies of state regulations.
This article will clearly illustrate that despite CSR’s rising relevance within 
corporate discourse, it fails to ensure corporate responsibility. While there has been a 
willingness to adopt measures of corporate social responsibility, a major problem still 
exists. This problem is the development of CSR as a self-centred, public relations tool 
that is focused more on image presentation than identifying a corporation’s social impact. 
This problem present hurdles in demanding corporations behave in a responsible manner, 
regardless of location or whether they are formally recognized and publicly praised.
As a result corporations have been able to use an unregulated set of self-mandated 
guidelines as a means of deception. With no formalized doctrine or forum to enforce 
CSR, it can be easily manipulated by the corporation for its own benefit rather than the 
benefit of the corporation’s stakeholders. Corporate social responsibility, therefore, 
becomes another instrument of power placed in the hands of the corporation
The concept of CSR is not at all new. However, little research has been done on 
its direct application, and the ideological climate and motivations that fostered its 
increasing acceptance. Not much research has been conducted to assess whether socially 
responsible corporate investment results from the introduction of CSR policies or,
1
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alternatively, whether CSR policies are mostly unregulated guidelines subject to 
manipulation. This article addresses this gap in the literature. First it will examine the 
political and economic context behind the rise o f the discourse o f corporate social 
responsibility. It will display the rise of CSR policies as a means o f filling the role left 
increasingly vacant as the shift towards neo-liberal policies have entrenched themselves 
within state governments. Following the theoretical works o f Dean (2003) and Rose 
(1999), this article will apply the neo-liberal concept o f shifting responsibilization to a 
specific case to illustrate the shortcomings o f CSR policies and how they facilitate the 
shift in the responsibility o f corporate behaviour from the state to the corporation and 
consumers. Second, it will analyse a specific case study o f a Canadian company, Encana, 
that prides itself on its CSR policies, yet continues to violate human rights and destroy 
the environment in Ecuador.
The case of Encana, a Canadian oil company operating in Ecuador provides clear 
evidence that the discourse of CSR fails to guarantee corporately responsible investment 
when left unregulated. Based on an analysis of academic articles, articles posted on 
various websites, newspaper and magazine articles and an interview with Toby Heaps of 
Corporate Knights Magazine, this article examines EnCana’s behaviour and use of the 
CSR policy.
Economic Restructuring and the Responsibilities o f  Corporations and Citizens
The development of CSR within the past twenty-five years is related to changes in 
the global political economy (Manokha, 2004: 56). The state has been radically 
transformed through the processes of neo-liberalism which include downsizing the role of
2
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the state in a shift from a traditional central bureaucratic welfare state towards a form of 
market-driven governance. It involves a transferring o f responsibility from state 
regulating bodies to corporations and individuals themselves. This is not to say that the 
state no longer exists, or that it is no longer a dominant figure among global power 
structures, rather that its role is changing and that its influence is being eclipsed by other 
forces.
The rise of CSR can be attributed in large part to the changing dynamics of 
government, in particular how states govern. The process of neo-liberalism has created a 
dramatic shift in the role of the state. It has caused a shrinking role of the state in 
regulating corporate activity and off-loaded that responsibility to corporations 
themselves. Mitchell Dean (2003) identifies a process o f creating a responsible, 
autonomous citizenry through a reconfiguration of the welfare state under neo-liberalism 
(179). In this sense the role of the government becomes more reflexive such that the state 
is no longer responsible for the citizen from the cradle to the grave. Dean (2003) argues 
that neo-liberal ideology offers a distinct type of freedom that is tied to the market, which 
is a rejection of the previous welfare regimes (179). In this sense the state is not 
responsible for events of the market. Rather, individuals must adhere to a new 
prudetialism such that they are now responsible for minimizing their own risks. 
Individuals are no longer prudent as a means of duty to the state; rather they must become 
prudent in order to take care of themselves. The same can be said for corporations. No 
longer is the state completely responsible to regulate the corporation, rather, the 
corporation must now work to regulate its own risks as well as its impact on its 
stakeholders. The role of the state therefore, is simply to ensure individual rights and the
3
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empowerment of the individual (Rose, 1999: 139). Rather than the state solving the 
problems of the citizenry and creating dependency, neo-liberal policies allow 
governments to create new spaces where markets can be created and function. This shift 
from passivity to activity creates a sense o f responsibility and self-actualization on the 
part o f the individual (Rose, 1999: 145). Dean maintains that the shift towards neo­
liberal policies is not the end of the social, rather that the social is “reconfigured within 
constructed markets operating through agency and governed at a distance by technologies 
o f performance” (Dean, 2003: 193). He introduces the term “responsible autonomy” as a 
means of defining indirect regulation (Dean, 2003: 196). Consequently traditional 
bureaucracies of the state are replaced with corporatized units based on competition.
This competition, it is argued, creates efficiency unattainable within a centralized 
bureaucracy. Together with individual responsibilization, this corporatization o f state 
bodies and the downsizing of the state’s role in regulating corporate activity have left 
corporations in the position to operate with increased autonomy with minimal regulation 
through indirect channels such as a doctrine of corporate social responsibility. What had 
been simply a concept of ethics has developed into a doctrine of market-based regulation 
with competition within an open market as a means of regulating performance.
The traditional welfare state has been characterized as an inefficient, oppressive, 
controlling central bureaucratic mechanism that has failed to reduce poverty and bring 
about equality. Such criticism from both the political right and left have aided the 
implementation of neo-liberal ideologies of deregulation that gained strength during the 
1970s, 80s, and 90s (Dean, 2003: 153). The effects of deregulation o f corporate activity 
have been unfolding in the past 25 years. Beginning in the 1970s, deregulation has
4
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affected the American banking, transportation, and telecommunication industries that 
coincide with the rise of neo-liberal policy in Western democracies (Horwitz, 1986). 
Raines and Leathers (1995) as well as Daraio and Turchetti (2004) assess similar trends 
towards deregulation pursued by Asian and European governments.
Historically, industry regulations have been seen as the hallmark of the 
interventionist state and a democratic victory of the will o f the people to persevere in the 
struggle against corporate interests (Trebing, 2004: 1). Conversely, critics of state 
regulation see it as a hindrance to economic activity which in turn creates artificial cartels 
of dependency and “parasitic social welfare systems” which cause inefficiency and 
corruption (Horwitz, 1986: 140). Horwitz identifies the process of corrupting regulatory 
bureaucracies such that they have been taken over by the very interests they are trying to 
regulate. He likens this process to neo-Marxist capture theory which states that a 
revolving door regulatory system made popular in Japan places industry elites in 
regulatory agencies and vice versa such that regulatory bodies have become corrupted 
and sterile (Horwitz, 1986: 140; Richter, 2001: 19). Structural Marxists have argued that 
regulatory agencies respond only at the request of industry to maintain market order. 
Coming from a dramatically different perspective, the Chicago School of free-market 
economics similarly argues that industry regulation more often than not creates exclusive 
cartels. Unlike the Structural Marxists that call for a purification and democratization of 
regulatory agencies, free-market economists call for a dismantling of the entire process 
with control put into the hands of the market (Horwitz, 1986: 141). Finding criticism 
from both the political left and right, the case for state regulation has become increasingly
5
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difficult to make within a climate o f increasing legitimization o f neo-liberal policy in 
state legislation.
Perceived bureaucratic inefficiencies have been blamed on regulatory regimes 
which are said to have led to stagnation within industry (Trebing, 2004: 2). As various 
American industries were losing ground to foreign competitors, deregulation was seen as 
the only means of maintaining American corporate hegemony. The same rationale was 
employed in Japan to maintain the supremacy of its financial markets under increasing 
pressure from global competition (Raines and Leathers, 1995: 362). Weeks argues that 
less regulation and freer trade is imperative in establishing a country’s competitive 
advantage (Weeks, 1999: 49). Therefore, it was a perceived complacency of the 
corporations that initiated and legitimized this form of deregulation within the political 
and civil realm (Horwitz, 1986: 147). Likewise, pressure from organizations such as the 
World Bank encouraged an end to economic trade regulation in several emerging areas 
such as Latin American markets (Weeks, 1999: 50).
While existing literature has provided a detailed analysis o f the factors that 
motivated states to pursue policies of deregulation, as well as literature that has been 
critical of deregulation’s impact, very little research has illuminated the connection 
between these policies and the rise of CSR. This paper provides clear evidence that the 
move towards neo-liberal policies empower corporations to manipulate public trust while 
professing to do the contrary through policies of CSR.
A broad-based acceptance of deregulation and its motivating force of neo-liberal 
policy have brought into question many of the securities previously taken for granted 
under the values of the welfare state. It has opened the door to an increasing shift away
6
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from the state as the traditional benefactor and regulator of the interests of civil society to 
an emphasis on corporate self-governance.
The Rise o f  Corporate Social Responsibility
Corporate social responsibility renders itself open to various interpretations. In 
essence, the concept refers simply to a set of standards or ethics that extends the 
definition o f stakeholder beyond financial shareholders to all individuals, as well as the 
physical environment, affected by the corporation’s actions. This is based on the notion 
that corporations are not simply responsible to make a profit, but to ensure that its effect 
on individuals and communities is positive and sustainable. This mentality is in part 
derived from neo-liberal doctrine of individual responsibility. Since the state is 
increasingly less involved in regulating corporate activities, CSR is seen as a means of 
filling the void left in the wake of a dismantled welfare state. Shifting responsibility 
away from state governments places consumers in the position previously held by state 
regulating bodies. Market-based regulation, it is argued, empowers consumers to hold 
corporations accountable for their behaviour such that regulating authority is not derived 
from the state, but from consumer preference and action. (Ruggie, 2004: 510-514; 
Cashore, 2002: 504)
Jackson and Nelson (2004) argue that the development of corporate social 
responsibility has been mandated by two prevailing developments of the developed 
world: the crisis of inequality and the crisis of trust. The development of information 
technology has made it infinitely easier to share data in shorter amounts of time and 
across greater distances. This has ushered in widespread awareness of social inequalities
7
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both domestically and internationally (Jackson and Nelson, 2004: 21). Recent domestic 
trends of increasing wage gaps, decreasing net worth and real wages for the lower 
percentiles of the population become even more potent in the light of exponential 
increases in executive pay and corporate profits. Such trends are responsible for igniting 
the crisis on inequality. These domestic realities coupled with the growing awareness of 
corporate activity in foreign locations have resulted in widespread social action such as 
the boycott of Nestle products in the 1980s and the campaign against Nike in the mid 
1990s that can have a damaging impact on economic performance.
The crisis o f trust can also be very damaging to a corporation’s economic 
performance. Fortune magazine’s editorial director Geoffrey Colvin (2002) states that “a 
company’s trustworthiness, embodied in brand and reputation, is increasingly all 
customers, employees, and investors have to rely on .. .Experience shows that this asset is 
built slowly and painfully but can be lost in the blink of an eye, and in losing it, you may 
lose everything” (April 29, 2002). Trust and confidence are vital to the economics of a 
free-market system. Losing that confidence can lead to dramatic collapse. Never was 
this more apparent than during 2000-2003 when highly publicized corporate implosions 
of Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, and Arthur Andersen cost employees, customers, and 
pensions plans billions of dollars. Fear of losing the trust of consumers and/or investors 
may have pushed corporations to formulate new policies of corporate social 
responsibility.
In addition, as Henderson (2001) points out, CSR is propelled in large part by 
public concern with environmental issues such as global warming and de-forestation. 
Furthermore, he argues that hostility towards rising corporate profit placed corporate
8
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giants in the spotlight. Such criticisms are facilitated by advancements in communication 
technology that have given NGOs greater influence and reach in organizing anti­
corporate campaigns (29, 30).
The increasing inclusion of CSR within corporate policy is a clear indication of 
the need corporate decision makers see for presenting a positive social image to 
consumers. The two most obvious areas o f corporate presentation are through annual 
reports and company websites. As an economic organization a corporation produces 
annual financial reports. This has been unchanging since the conception of public 
shareholding. The most dramatic recent trend in reporting has been the development of 
sustainability reporting that accompany annual financial reports. Sustainability reports 
provide more than simply economic details, but address environmental concerns, 
philanthropic giving, issues of corporate governance, and a variety of other social issues 
that are directed at an audience beyond shareholders. The quantity of sustainability 
reports has increased substantially throughout the 1990s (Joseph, 2002: 97). In 2003 the 
Global Reporting Initiative claimed that over 2500 corporations provide environmental or 
sustainability reports (Neef, 2003: 206).
Corporate websites have also become a popular tool in promoting a corporation’s 
views and commitments to CSR. While websites themselves were virtually non-existent 
in the 1980s, by 1998 a sample of Fortune 500 companies displayed that the vast majority 
of corporations had website and 82% were using the website as a means of promoting the 
firm’s social responsibility (Esrock and Leichty, 1998: 311). The use of a website can 
provide a variety of benefits for a corporation. A website can be an active tool in 
organizational self-presentation that “allow corporations to set public policy agendas”
9
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(Esrock and Leichty, 1998: 306). Most importantly it allows corporations the ability to 
set their own agenda by avoiding media gatekeepers (Esrock and Leichty, 1998: 306). It 
allows corporations to present as fact exactly what they want to say to the largest possible 
audience.
Recognizing the state’s declining role in corporate governance, a corporation’s 
move towards CSR becomes a response to the expectations o f activists within civil 
society as well as the state. Beginning as an expectation that a corporation would obey 
the laws of capitalism and the laws of the state, the concept o f CSR has moved beyond 
the ethics of economic operation to expect corporations to be innovative and go beyond 
what is required by law, and respond to social norms of philanthropy and charitable 
giving (Carroll, 1999: 283). This included the development o f stakeholder theory that 
identified the stakeholders of a corporation as more than just the employees and the 
shareholders, but also the suppliers, customers, local communities and all those 
connected to and affected by the operations of the corporation.
State governments are increasingly pushing the doctrine of CSR as a means of 
indirectly regulating corporate behaviour at a distance. In 2001 the member governments 
at the Summit of the Americas in Quebec City initiated the first Hemisphere-wide 
conference on CSR. This indicates a growing acceptance of CSR as a new wave of 
corporate self-regulation (“Americas Conference on Corporate Social Responsibility 
Promotes Alliances for Sustainable Development of Latin America and Caribbean.” 
w w w .iadb.org/exr/PRENSA/2002/cp21202e.htm). The US Department of State openly 
endorses CSR guidelines as “a set of non-binding recommendations from governments to 
corporations” which are intended to “help companies operate in harmony with
10
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government policies and communities.” The Department professes its desire to form 
voluntary partnerships with corporations, which it believes is the most effective means of 
producing sustainable results (Craner, 2002). This dramatically displays the effect of 
neo-liberal policy on state government initiatives.
CSR and Its Critics: Past and Present
While corporations seem to be accepting notions o f social responsibility in large 
numbers, CSR itself has been open to a great deal o f criticism. More commonly 
criticized for not being sufficiently regulated or being a weak and voluntary policy, CSR 
is also receiving a renaissance of criticism on economic grounds that echo Milton 
Friedman’s thoughts of the 1970s that “the only responsibility o f business is to make a 
profit” (Roberts, 2003: 255). Henderson argues that CSR provides a greater burden on all 
levels of management that has not proven to help either business or society (Henderson, 
2001: 59). The International Chamber of Commerce argued that a mandatory code of 
conduct “would put the clock back to a bygone era” (Richter, 2001: 15). Henderson 
(2001) argues that CSR is a “misguided virtue” propagated as “part of the mythology of 
global salvationism” (147) which is rooted in a “Salvationist coalition” that presents a 
distorted view of the impacts of globalization” (83).
On the opposing side of the spectrum CSR can be criticized as a tool that has been 
captured by corporations to serve their own needs of public relations and identity 
presentation. Likewise, it can be argued that the policies of CSR do not go far enough, 
and that its ambiguity renders it useless. The criticism surrounding the concept’s 
ambiguity can be seen through three main concerns. First there is the problem of
1 1
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definition. Criticism arises from the fact that there is no clear universal definition of 
CSR. While various academics and corporations alike dating back over fifty years have 
attempted to define the term and all that it encompasses, there still remains no consensus 
or solid operational definition nor is there a clear conceptual understanding of what 
exactly should be classified as the social good (Roberts, 2003: 250; Esrock and Leichty, 
1998: 307; Henderson, 2001: 49). The second major problem surrounds CSR’s 
application. CSR is a voluntary policy. It is not mandated by any organization or 
government and is up to the corporation to apply it however is seen fit. There is no real 
right or wrong application and no necessity to apply it if  the corporation does not see its 
values lining up with those of CSR (Neef, 2003: 113; Joseph, 2002: 96; Richter, 2001: 
77). The final criticism is that of verification. Since the number of sustainability reports 
has continually increased, there remains a great deal of question surrounding the validity 
of environmental and social claims made by a specific corporation. Will a corporation 
accurately report its own faults and shortcomings? Many sustainability reports are not 
audited by an independent third party to verify the claims a company makes (Joseph, 
2002: 98).
As mentioned earlier, in the 1970s and 80s supporters of the regulatory capture 
theory feared that industry leaders occupied positions on state regulatory boards 
(Horwitz, 1986: 140; Richter, 2001: 19). Similar fears prompt current criticism of CSR 
as being captured by corporations and used to further their own purposes. A major 
problem for anti-corporate activists during the Nestle infant formula boycott of the 1970s 
and 1980s was when corporations and regulating bodies came together to negotiate on the 
contents of an industry code of conduct. The controversy over the marketing o f infant
12
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formula included a dispute between the industry and the WHO and United Nations. The 
industry fought to avoid the implementation o f a code o f conduct that would guide its 
marketing practices. Intense negotiation resulted in a watered down, weakly worded 
document that the industry could use to legitimize its actions (Richter, 2001: 62). While 
Nestle, the industry’s largest producer, worked the hardest to block any form of 
regulation, it simultaneously established its own office of corporate responsibility in 
1977. This may seem to be a contradiction. However, when CSR is understood as an 
image enhancement, the reasons surrounding the move of corporate policy towards 
(apparent) acceptance of a CSR doctrine becomes clearer (Richter, 2001: 54).
In light of these criticisms, it is necessary to explore specific empirical examples 
of the application o f CSR policies to assess the degree to which it might be a genuine 
attempt to operate responsibly rather than a public relations ploy. The rest o f the paper 
will focus on the case of Encana, a Canadian oil company, and its operations in Ecuador. 
It will illustrate the contradiction between its stated commitment to socially responsible 
investment and its actual performance.
The Case o f EnCana
The story o f EnCana dates back over one hundred years. While the company in 
its present form was only created in 2002 by the merger of PanCanadian Energy and the 
Alberta Energy Company, the company’s roots begin in state-mandated initiatives. In 
1881 the Canadian government granted the Canadian Pacific Railway twenty five million 
acres of land as part of a deal to build a transcontinental railway. Such land was most 
certainly not vacant, but part of a traditional aboriginal hunting and trapping grounds. In
13
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1883 CP workers discovered natural gas while drilling for a well outside Medicine Hat, 
Alberta. In 1958 CP created the Canadian Pacific Oil and Gas Company to manage its 
mineral rights holdings. Merging with Central Del Rio Oil in 1971, the PanCanadian 
Energy Company was created. By 1975 the government o f Alberta had decided to 
establish a public energy corporation in which it would hold a 50% stake “to provide 
Albertans and other Canadians with an opportunity to participate, through share 
ownership, in the industrial and energy-related growth o f Alberta” (www.encana.ca/ 
whoweare/history/index.html). A steady divestment o f shares by the government resulted 
in the government selling its remaining shares in the company by 1993, making it a 
completely publicly traded company.
In 1999, the Alberta energy company purchased Pacalta Resources and its 
operations in Ecuador. The future growth o f Ecuador’s oil industry was limited by the 
existing SOTE pipeline built by the government in 1975 that was operating at capacity. 
Alberta Energy, which became EnCana, became the primary stakeholder (36.3%) of a 
consortium that negotiated a deal to develop a new pipeline from the Amazonian interior 
to the Pacific coast for export. The Oleoductos Crudos Pesados (OCP) consortium 
pipeline would cross over 500 km, cost over $1.1 billion US and allow EnCana to 
increase production from 51 000 barrels per day to over 90 000 barrels per day 
(McCleam, 2003).
While the presence o f a major international oil corporation operating in an 
undeveloped country such as Ecuador is bound to face pockets of resistance from 
affected local populations, the level of hostility and the international campaign mounted 
against the company have surprised both observers and management. What is
14
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particularly troubling about EnCana’s involvement in Ecuador is not simply its blatant
disregard for the environmental and social well being of Ecuador and its residents, but its
persistence that its widely publicized corporate constitution is industry leading, and
guides all of its dealings and operations as an “inner compass” (www.encana.ca/pdfs/
responsibility/English_Constitution.pdf). EnCana claims that wherever it operates, it
demands that everything it does is held to the same high standard. However, the
construction of the OCP pipeline has forced many o f EnCana’s claims into the spotlight.
An examination of EnCana’s corporate constitution reveals many noble ideas that
greatly exceed the traditional corporate commitment to economic value creation. It offers
a moral connection between its business practices and its economic expectations:
To excel, to achieve our goals, we must have a shared set of moral
principles -  an inner compass -  that guides our behaviour, and we
must have business principles that clearly show the path we will
travel. We need to define what we should expect of ourselves and
what we can expect of each other. (Corporate Constitution: 9, www.encana.ca/
/pdfs/responsibility/English_Constitution.pdf)
The Constitution makes very bold claims about how the corporation will conduct itself
and how its success is to be measured,
We function on the basis of trust, integrity, and respect. We are 
committed to benchmark practices in safety and environmental 
stewardship, ethical business conduct, and community responsibility.
Our success is measured through both our behaviour and our bottom 
line. (11)
It states that EnCana will not tolerate unlawful or unethical behaviour, intimidation or 
harassment, environmental, health or safety negligence, or workplace discrimination and 
deceptive communication (24).
If one is to truly accept EnCana’s claim that all of its operations are subject to the 
same set of standards world-wide, it may seem incredibly difficult to comprehend why
15
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such outrage has resulted from practices of the above mentioned calibre. The obvious 
answer is that there must exist a contradiction between the corporate policies published 
and the real-time procedures taking place in Ecuador.
The majority o f the problems EnCana has faced in Ecuador surround the OCP 
pipeline. The development of such a large-scale infrastructural endeavour delivered a 
great deal o f publicity that was initially welcomed by the company. The Ecuadorian 
environmental protection group, Accion Ecologica, has been one of the most vocal 
organizations combating EnCana’s endeavours from within Ecuador. It has been very 
critical of EnCana’s environmental practices of drill sites as well as the procedures and 
route chosen in the construction of the OCP pipeline. Much o f the criticism stems from 
the fact that EnCana is operating in one of the richest biologically diverse areas of the 
globe: the Amazonian rainforest. Major practical violations have been reported that lead 
to severe health affects. Accion Ecologica has reported direct dumping of wastewaters 
into fresh water rivers. It has conducted tests o f drinking water near drill sites that show 
unacceptable levels of contamination (“EnCana.” www.torontoenvironment.org/ecuador/ 
Canadian.Htm#encana). Matthew McCleam of Canadian Business magazine documents 
widespread criticism of local farmers whose farms near sites of production have become 
barren and whose irrigation streams have become filthy and unusable as a result of 
pipeline construction (2003).
While EnCana is directly and knowingly contaminating water sources, critics 
have been equally outraged by the potential ecological disasters that could occur at one of 
many points along the pipeline’s route. The OCP pipeline crosses eleven 
environmentally protected areas, ninety-four seismic fault lines, and passes six active
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volcanoes (Clerk, 2004). On March 1, 2003 sixty barrels of oil spilled from a pumping 
station along the pipeline during an initial test. Reports were confirmed by OCP 
representative who later estimated an operational spill could spew roughly 3050 barrels 
before being controlled (“Environmental Irresponsibility, Corruption and Human Rights 
Abuse: Canada’s EnCana Corporation’s Contribution to Ecuadorian Development.” 
www.rainforestinfo.org.au/ocp/canada%20ethical.htm). Oil spills along the existing 
SOTE pipeline were common, with six in the late 1980s alone (MacCleam, 2003). While 
critics fear the expansive pipelines susceptibility to landslides and other seismic activity 
could be disastrous to the ecologically sensitive areas through which it passes, EnCana’s 
officials have maintained that the construction of the pipeline was engineered to 
withstand a variety of potential problems. Heaps (personal interview, November 9, 2004) 
recalls a photograph he took of the pipeline while under construction that had been 
contorted and mangled from a recent landslide. Tales of construction shortcuts and 
questionable practices prevail in local communities surrounding the pipeline. Nadja 
Drost’s film footage displays a section o f the pipeline that is supposed to be 1.5 m below 
ground level that is clearly visible through a thin layer of soil (Drost and Merino, 2004).
EnCana has always claimed that the processes leading to the conception and 
construction of the OCP pipeline have followed World Bank guidelines demanded by the 
majority lender for the project: Germany’s WestLB Bank (MacCleam, 2003). However, 
Robert Goodland, former ecologist for the World Bank, reviewed the OCP environmental 
impact report and concluded that the OCP had determined the pipeline route long before 
the assessment was complete and that it lacked consultation with the people it affected. 
The pipeline route also violated the natural habitats policy because it crossed protected
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environmental reserves. OCP’s proposal also violates the involuntary relocation policy 
o f the World Bank which requires relocation plans and adequate compensation which the 
OCP did not include (MacCleam, 2003). The OCP rejected all allegations of wrong­
doing, claiming that Mr. Goodland was given misleading information.
Perhaps the most alarming events coming from Ecuador are not simply the 
environmental disregard shown by EnCana and its subsidiaries, but particularly the 
accusations of blatant human rights violations. The actions o f EnCana and the OCP have 
sparked protests across the country (MacCleam, 2003). Organized protests surrounding 
the pipeline’s route through the protected Mindo Cloudforest Reserve were met with tear 
gas and arrest of several protesters (“Residents and Environmentalists Paralyze OCP 
Pipeline Construction in Mindo.” www.amazonwatch.org/_newsroom/ view_news.php? 
id=491; Nelson, 2002). In a similar ten day protest scuffles between security forces and 
protesters left two civilians dead and five wounded (Jermyn and Shirley, 2002, Heaps, 
“Tightrope Act.” www.corporateknights.ca /stories/ecuador.asp).
The acquisition of land from private landowners for the 500 km pipeline was 
perhaps one o f the OCP’s greatest challenges that have led to the greatest degree of 
public outrage. In the Ecuadorean Amazon, subsistence farming is the main economic 
activity for local dwellers. And consequently, loss of land results in a loss of livelihood 
for them. Yet this did not seem to deter EnCana and the OCP from going ahead with their 
plan and expropriating the land they required. Local residents complain of aggression 
and intimidation. The OCP hired security forces to forcibly coerce people to sell their 
land. Over two hundred landowners lodged complaints that the OCP did not pay them 
for their land, or paid less than the agreed amount. Other complaints included brutality
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against women and children (Heaps, “Tightrope Act”). When the Ecuadorian Congress 
was commissioned to form a hearing for residents to voice their concerns, several 
hundred residents along the pipeline route complained o f police brutality, intimidation, 
and the use of tear gas to force people from occupied homes (“Environmental 
Irresponsibility...” www.rainforestinfo.org.au/ocp/canada% 20ethical.htm). Authorities 
have continually denied responsibility for police and security force actions arguing that 
they are under the paid control of the OCP and are therefore not the responsibility of the 
state (“Environmental Irresponsibility...” www.rainforestinfo.org.au/ocp/canada% 
20ethical.htm; Heaps, “Tightrope Act.”).
Toby Heaps recalled a level of outrage among the local population that he had 
never before witnessed. This outrage was coupled together with an equally fervent denial 
on the part o f EnCana of any wrongdoing. His visit to Ecuador brought a noticeable 
antagonism from the local population simply due to the association with EnCana as a 
Canadian corporation. He recalls that “the people at EnCana are just completely 
willingly, knowingly, or mischievously oblivious to it” (Heaps, personal interview, 
November 9, 2004). As an editor of a business magazine, Heaps professed a desire to 
determine a clear and unbiased analysis o f the situation in Ecuador. He concedes the 
validity of the “Golden Goose” phenomenon. This is the desire of a local population 
brandishing unfounded claims against a multinational corporation in hopes of windfall 
community development in return for community cooperation. However, in the 
Ecuadorian situation, Heaps witnessed blatant disregard for the well being of local 
populations, and a deep-rooted widespread outrage for the severity of the situation. He 
states, “I tried to find someone that was happy about it [the pipeline]. I talked to
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hundreds of people along where it was being built, everyone was pissed” (Heaps, 
personal interview, November 9, 2004).
EnCana has repeatedly answered the criticisms lobbied against it by claiming that 
its involvement in Ecuador is for the benefit of the entire nation; that the taxes, royalties, 
and jobs they supply are in dire need in a country as underdeveloped as Ecuador. They 
also argue that they go the extra mile by providing community programs that benefit the 
neglected regions of the nation. The NanPaz foundation was set up by EnCana as a 
community development centre but has itself faced serious allegations of creating 
division in the community. Activists allege that EnCana has used the foundation to buy 
off community leaders with jobs as a means o f controlling public sentiment 
(“Environmental Irresponsibility...” www.rainforestinfo.org.au/ocp/Canada%20ethical. 
htm). MacCleam (2003) identifies the attitudes of critics who see the “OCP’s community 
relations efforts as thinly veiled ploys to buy consent.” The cries of the local Ecuadorian 
public were being heard with increasing clarity at the international level. International 
NGOs such as Greenpeace Canada, the Toronto Environmental Alliance, the David 
Suzuki Foundation, Global Aware, and the Sierra Club all called on EnCana to pull out of 
OCP. A variety of different NGOs organized the Sassenberg Summit in Germany to 
strategize intensified pressure on home countries of OCP members (“International 
Alliance Vows to Intensify Opposition in Eight Countries to Ecuador’s OCP Oil 
Pipeline.” www.amazonwatch.org/newsroom/view_news.php?id=493).
Protests of the German lending bank WestLB have resulted in parliamentary 
hearings investigating the matter. While unsuccessful in persuading the bank to 
withdraw its funding from the project, the collaborative efforts of making those involved
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aware have not fallen on completely deaf ears. Michael Jantzi Research Associates, a 
firm advising clients on socially responsible investment considers EnCana ineligible for 
socially responsible portfolios because o f its involvement in the OCP (MacCleam, 2003). 
Likewise, the social unrest has delivered an instability that has affected the OCP’s credit 
rating. Moody’s Investor’s Service downgraded their rating of the OCP to near junk 
status (MacCleam, 2003). However, these criticisms and concerns have done little to 
change EnCana’s behaviour.
These allegations are only magnified by the insistence by EnCana that all of its 
operations meet the requirements laid out in its own corporate constitution. Such 
insistence conflicts with the reality of EnCana’s behaviour in Ecuador. EnCana’s 
response is that the criticisms regarding its Ecuadorian operations are grossly 
exaggerated. It could also be argued that the majority of the problems were a result o f the 
OCP. Therefore, EnCana may not have been aware o f the reality of the situation. 
However, EnCana is the largest stakeholder in the consortium with 36.3%. This makes it 
fairly unlikely that the company would hold such a large stake of a major development 
project (on which the future o f its Ecuadorian operations depended) in any sort of hands- 
off approach. This is in fact evident by the appointment of Andrew Patterson, EnCana’s 
Chief Financial Officer (CFO) as the president of the OCP. This allowed EnCana direct 
influence and knowledge of OCP’s actions but also strengthens its responsibility for 
whatever the OCP and its contractors do.
The question that needs to be asked is: if EnCana was “knowingly, willingly, or 
mischievously” aware of the problems it and the OCP were causing, what is the purpose 
of having and flaunting a corporate constitution? The answer to this question is directly
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related to the benefits provided by such a constitution. While there is an increasing 
amount of research pointing to the direct benefits o f having a corporate code of conduct 
(Jackson and Nelson, 2004; Neef, 2003; Schwartz and Gibb, 1999) as well as evidence 
supporting consumer and employee expectation of ethical behaviour (Joseph, 2002; Mohr 
and Webb, 2001; Ryan, 1986), the most convincing need for the development of a 
corporate code o f ethics comes from events o f crisis. Examples o f Nestle, Nike, Shell, 
Texico, Johnson & Johnson, etc. clearly demonstrate episodes that necessitate the 
development of a code, as well as evidence to respective competitors of the same. The 
development of a code provides a corporation a licence to operate (Heaps and Rea, “Four 
Companies and a Code.” www.corporateknights.ca/stories/colombia.asp). It legitimizes 
their operations and provides it a concrete document to fall back when its behaviour 
comes under attack. When confronted about its operations in Ecuador, EnCana’s first 
response always goes back to its corporate constitution as though no company with such 
high standards could possibly do anything wrong.
The case of EnCana clearly displays its desire to provide a favourable image of 
itself, particularly because of its role in a high-risk industry such as petroleum extraction. 
The importance of corporate image is magnified within politically active and investor- 
rich nations. For both of these reasons, EnCana would have added incentive to develop 
and abide by its code of ethics in such nations. As a result, EnCana regularly receives 
praise for its high social standards when working in Canada and has received awards for 
its behaviour (MacCleam, 2003; Sheremata, 2003). When its actions are visible to a 
public that has the power of investment and democratic influence over state governments, 
EnCana seems to behave well. Likewise, when there is an increasing portion of the
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population involving themselves in criteria-based social investing, and when one of 
EnCana’s top seven institutional investors is Ethical Funds (“EnCana.” 
www.torontoenvironment.org/ecuador/canadian.Htm#encana), EnCana seems to take its 
corporate constitution more seriously. However, when outside of those arenas in remote 
locations beyond the moral proximity o f investors and consumers, EnCana’s behaviour 
begins to look remarkably different.
Processes of neo-liberalism and the deregulation of the international move of 
capital have provided major corporations effective tools to enlarge their sphere of 
influence in the void created by a shrinking state. Ecuador in particular has fallen victim 
to circumstances o f insurmountable debt that have left the nation at the mercy of 
international oil corporations and the revenues they produce. Corporate capital is 
subsequently elevated into a powerful position in which it can easily exploit foreign 
markets for its own gain. EnCana is no exception.
As a result, EnCana has been able to maximize its profits. 2004 sales growth 
targets rose from 10% to 15% by mid 2004 (“EnCana raises sales targets.” 
www.cbcnews.ca) with quarterly profits that topped $1 billion for both the first and 
second quarters of 2004 (Jang, 2004). However, despite EnCana’s ability to generate 
incredible wealth from its foreign operations in Ecuador, its moral obligations outlined in 
its corporate constitution get lost. Its global expansion and overwhelming profits have 
not been met with the same expansion of EnCana’s moral conscience. The reality of 
EnCana’s behaviour in Ecuador displays how easy and viable it can be for a corporation 
to constantly propagate a constitution of responsibility and ethics yet still operate 
horrendously contrary to its own published values of CSR. This evidence demonstrates
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how dangerous problems that can persist despite constructive moves towards a discourse 
of CSR. While this in no way justifies the action o f EnCana, it does provide insight as to 
how and why this contradiction between word and deed could occur.
Conclusion
The moral shift o f increased social, consumer, and investor activism of the past 
decade may indeed be having a positive affect on the development o f campaigns of CSR. 
However, the notions of self-government and individual responsibilization which inhabit 
neo-liberal policies find a way of negating a positive affect and turning it into an 
additional tool o f enterprise. The increasing void of formalized regulatory supervision 
has created a climate ripe for a self-serving, imaged based doctrine o f CSR. EnCana has 
taken full advantage of an opportunity to exploit not only a foreign nation desperately in 
need of the tax revenues it provides, but it is also guilty o f exploiting the moral 
conscience o f the North American population. EnCana’s propagation o f an industry 
leading corporate constitution can be thought of little more than wishful thinking when 
observed in the light of its ongoing behaviour. When the corporate benefit of a code of 
CSR is understood, it is difficult to see EnCana’s constitution as anything other than a 
public relations tool. This is particularly a powerful tool in the oil extractive industry that 
is so heavily dependent on large-scale new investment for the replacement of production 
sites. A CSR code in this industry can act to convincing both risk-minded and socially- 
minded investors who would rather stay clear of a volatile and potentially damaging 
industry such as resource extraction.
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The problem for EnCana in Ecuador is that the same technologies that have 
aided the transfer of capital and corporate information between remote locations allowing 
EnCana to operate easily all over the world have also allowed civil unrest in those remote 
locations to become widely publicized world-wide. The result has been a movement of 
solidarity spanning the globe working to aid the plight of the Ecuadorian population and 
demand responsible action from EnCana.
This article provides a clear example how adopting policies of neo-liberalism can 
have very real and damaging effects. It applies theory to practice to illustrate the 
tremendous impact o f pursuing a shift from formalized state regulation to individual 
responsibilization. Identifying the negative potential o f CSR to transfer increasing power 
into corporate hands, this study provides a sobering view of the dangers that follow the 
pursuit of new policies that have not yet been clearly defined or sufficiently debated.
Campaigns of corporate social responsibility have the potential to powerfully 
redefine the manner in which business is done and the subsequent affects thereof. 
Elowever, as this article illustrates, CSR can fall victim to various forces which shift and 
contort the ideals of the doctrine into a tool of publicity for the corporation rather than a 
genuine concern of its stakeholders. This article displays how easily this can occur. 
Whether or not CSR is motivated by valour intentions, the reality of this situation clearly 
illustrates how dangerous neo-liberal policies o f unregulated, self-mandated guidelines 
can be. Placing increasing power in the hands o f corporations such as EnCana clearly 
demonstrates how easily a well-intending doctrine of CSR can be easily manipulated to 
suit the demands and desires of its corporate propagators. Even when openly disclosed, 
accusations o f a corporation’s malpractice encounter ignorance and denial from those
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responsible. When asked to comment on the concerns raised in this article, EnCana 
denied an interview and said that questions regarding how it conducts its operations could 
be found in its corporate constitution published on its website. Such an unfortunate 
response clearly indicates the dangers of self-government and relaxed regulatory 
procedures in the operations o f corporations such as EnCana.
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